



In this paper, I  propose some philosophical reflections arising from the encounter with a  work of art, 
namely the Squatting Aphrodite, which is one of the Roman copies that is held in the same room as the 
Venus de Milo in the Louvre Museum in Paris, France. From the description of this artwork and the effect 
it has on the spectator, I  draw three main consequences: the conceptual difference between ordinary 
sensibility and everyday aesthetics; the criticism of aesthetic conformity, and the political implications 
of adopting an ordinary perspective towards aesthetic experience. | Keywords: Ordinary, Body, Greek 
Sculpture, Performance, Everyday Aesthetics
1. Being Struck by the Ordinary
When one visits the Hall of the Caryatids at the Louvre Museum, one wanders 
through the remains of Greek and Roman statuary. As soon as one enters, one 
passes under a balustrade held by columnal goddesses, the so-called caryatids, 
statuesque figures of immense women who hold the architectural forms on 
their heads, without really carrying their weight, as if architectural stone 
blocks were held by the vulnerable strength of their necks, in a posture of grace 
and power. At the other end of the room, opposite the entrance, as the 
culmination of the visit, one will come face to face with the Venus de Milo, the 
symbol of classical beauty. She is placed on a pedestal, alone in the middle of 
the last room, she appears as if she is raised above the ground, surrounded by 
tourists taking pictures of her, like paparazzi. 
We know the Venus de Milo, her fame has already touched us, we have heard of 
her, we have seen photographs, we already know her and now we meet her in 
real life for the first time. She seems to be looking at us from the top of her 
pose, her torso is undulating, her breasts and her stomach are naked, a  sheet 
surrounds her hips, and her arms are missing, even if one can guess their 
position. Her face is similar to Apollo’s: she has a beautiful, gentle but distant 
gaze, exactly like him. Her look is slightly androgynous just as his look is 
slightly feminine. She is larger and taller than human size. She incarnates the 
ideal beauty and she is indeed a goddess, a star.
Yet before reaching the Venus de Milo, one discovers other statues, some of 
them are relatively famous, some are very well preserved, some others are 
119BARBARA FORMIS Ordinary Sensibilia
broken, their bodies amputated. And there, before the end of the larger middle 
room, just to the left of the wall separating you from the Venus de Milo, next to 
a window, one will see a replica of the Squatting Aphrodite. It is also called the 
Venus of Vienna, it is quite a compact and round sculpture of a naked woman, 
coming out of a bath or preparing to go into it. 
This particular copy was discovered in 1827–1828 by M. Michoud in 
the  frigidarium of the thermal complex of Saint-Romain-en-Gal called the 
Mirror Palace, a place identified in 1835 by Prosper Mérimée on the right bank 
of the Rhone and classified in 1840. It is one of the numerous Roman replicas 
of a theme Hellenistic artists were fond of; that of Aphrodite in the bath. These 
ancient copies decorated baths and gardens. The original model, probably in 
bronze, has not survived. It is attributed to the Greek sculptor Doidalsas of 
Bithynia, according to the description of the portico of Octavia in Rome by 
Pliny the Elder. This sculpture, carved from Paros marble and polished, 
measures 140 x 42 x 60 cm.
Figure 1: Squatting Aphrodite.
Source: Photo by the author
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One will notice the representation of the folds of the skin on the belly of the 
figure as well as the marked right hip. If the Greeks represented Aphrodite as 
a  severe and cruel goddess, the Romans on their side, retained more of her 
benevolent aspect. The statue strikes us; it interests us and at the same time it 
makes us uncomfortable, we are intrigued by it, but also somehow driven back 
from it. It attracts us, but for no clear reasons, in a  sort of opaque way, it 
appeals to us in an intuitive way, we cannot really make sense of it, and it feels 
somehow liberating. It is a human-sized statue of which only the body remains. 
She is crouching, her back is bent, and her round belly bulges. The label tells us 
that she is represented as performing her toilette, we imagine her at the edge 
of a lake or a pond. We are embarrassed to surprise her in an intimate moment. 
The head, arms and feet are missing: the statue is damaged; traces of torn 
marble can be seen on her right buttock, on her thighs, and the neck shows 
a deep mark at the level of the internal central axis. She has been slaughtered. 
We are here in front of a trashed, wrecked beauty, so unclassical, without pride, 
and vulnerable. She has been caught during a  moment of an ordinary ritual, 
washing. Her curves are realistic, and contrary to the ideal of harmonious 
Greek beauty she carries scars of violence and mutilation. Moreover, nobody 
looks at her. All the visitors rush to the Venus de Milo who is assailed by photos: 
the visitors form a court around her, standing up to take a picture, aiming their 
cell phones upwards from below, admiring her immense and imposing figure. 
Meanwhile, the Squatting Aphrodite, being of human size and due to her 
posture and her height (it is only 140 cm tall), forces us to bend, to curve our 
backs, mirroring her posture. And whilst everybody is so  busy admiring the 
Venus de Milo, the Squatting Aphrodite looks lonely. She is indeed alone, next to 
a window, in a corner, as if left behind, as if she had been abandoned. 
Figure 2: Squatting Aphrodite.
Source: Photo by the author
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But if we take time to discover this ordinary beauty, if we explore her body, we 
will be surprised. The Squatting Aphrodite is neither attractive nor charismatic, 
she easily passes unnoticed, but she provides an aesthetic experience once we 
turn around her. Her body is rounded and full, and there, in the middle of her 
back, we are struck by an astonishing detail:  a very small hand, a child’s hand, 
placed on the right-hand side of her back, just at the level of the shoulder 
blades. The five fingers are intact and the hand is cut off at the level of the 
wrist. The label tells us that it is the hand of her son Eros, the demigod of love. 
Her son Eros is present in absentia, through a  hand alone, whilst his body is 
completely missing, and this lone hand will strike us as the ordinary but 
powerful bond of a lovingly feeling, the trace of a new sensibility. 
The Squatting Aphrodite is embedded in an ecological environment, she is not 
separating and establishing herself from a  distance, she is grounded and 
related to the natural elements. She is connected to the earth, she turns her 
body towards the ground and has a direct link to what Wittgenstein would call 
the “rough ground” that we have lost and to which philosophy has to be able to 
return. The Squatting Aphrodite is also connected to the element of water. She 
performs a  commonplace gesture of washing, keeping herself clean, purifying 
her body and keeping it in good health. Other replicas of the original Greek 
statue show that she is usually accompanied by her son Eros, leaning on her 
back. Between her and her son an exchange takes place of glances of complicity 
and love. In the replica in the Louvre, only the tiny hand of Eros has remained 
Figure 3: Squatting Aphrodite.
Source: Photo by the author
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on Aphrodite's  back since the rest of the body has disappeared.  Our gaze is 
electrified by this hand which is like a relic, a lost grasp, a gesture between the 
tragic and a  joke. This hand is entirely attached to the mother's back, as if to 
symbolize the bond of dependence, the ethics of care and relations that brings 
the goddess down to the status of the mother. 
The type of love that is expressed through this statue can be defined as 
ordinary. Why? Because it is a common and widely shared feeling because this 
sensibility recalls ‘love’ with a small ‘l’, ordinary love, maternal eroticism, the 
relationship and the interdependence of the bonds of care. It is a non-idealistic 
aesthetic feature marked by an elementary form of desire. This is how we are 
struck by ordinary aesthetic qualities: we don’t know about this figure before 
coming to the Louvre, we haven’t seen pictures representing it. This sculpture 
is not preceded by its fame, it is not perceived dominantly by its visual form. 
But we get to access this figure in another way, she touches us from the inside, 
through a  feeling: we understand the emotions the statue is communicating 
because we carry these emotions in our guts, we recognize the emotions that 
the Squatting Aphrodite is expressing not thru comprehension but from a non 
digested experience.
Why do we pay attention to the Venus de Milo, androgynous and proud in her 
posture, and not to this mutilated copy of the Squatting Aphrodite? Why is 
the  violated, vulnerable, realistic and ordinary body not attractive? Why is 
the  logic of beauty an aesthetics of verticality and not of horizontality? Why 
do we prefer to look at bodies that expose themselves to the gaze, bodies that 
do nothing, that are carried by their own audacity, instead of being interested 
in ordinary bodies, in everyday gestures, in those bodies that are doing 
something, caught in a universe of use and practice? If we erect the Venus de 
Milo on a  pedestal, and sideline the Squatting Aphrodite, if we relegate the 
latter to the category of the low and vulgar, it is because we rank theory as 
superior to practice, because we value the ideal over the ordinary and because 
we prefer an aesthetics of contemplation to an aesthetics of practice.
And yet, this hierarchy is not particularly stable and these distinctions are not 
very clear: they can be re-examined. It is not so much a question of rewriting 
the history of art and the logics of power, but rather of revealing intricate 
confusions between what is supposedly ugly and what is supposedly beautiful, 
vulnerability and strength, practice and theory, contemplation and use. This 
inquiry is helped along by recalling that the term aesthetics has two meanings: 
on the one hand it refers to harmony, order and visual contemplation, and on 
the other hand it is indebted to the senses, embodiment, disorder, violence and 
erotic desire. Indeed, the main reason why the Squatting Aphrodite does not 
encounter the same fate as the Venus de Milo is that she expresses the link 
between the aesthetic and the erotic in a  far more sensual way and connects 
the aesthetic to the realm of the body in all its earthly qualities. 
This mutilated, violated figure is above all a  maternal figure. She also 
incarnates the violence practised on certain subjects, who might be perceived 
as different or eccentric. This form of violence is related to her being 
123BARBARA FORMIS Ordinary Sensibilia
1 This expression by George Dickie, itself borrowed from Arthur Danto, has now become 
a standard way of defining the whole institutional context of art (See Dickie, 1973). 
a  maternal figure because maternity is a  condition of the female body. From 
a  feminist perspective, the Squatting Aphrodite is an alternative figure to 
masculinity and it stands for the minor figures and the subalterns. However, 
the differences, the conflict, the domination and the discrimination evoked 
here are not exclusive but inclusive. What I mean by this is that the Squatting 
Aphrodite strikes us not so  much by her specificity, but by the fact that she 
suggests a vulnerability that is more or less shared by everyone. She strikes us 
as ordinary because her eccentricity is a source of vulnerability. Indeed, human 
subjects are constructed through a  form of mediation which has its starting 
point in the body as the seat of consciousness, of force and weakness. In this 
manner the hand of Eros seems to act both as a call for help but also as support. 
The child helps the mother to carry herself, as if this hand came to support the 
fragility that unites them. The aesthetic feature that links these mutilated and 
love-driven figures is not that of beauty but that of sensitivity. Such 
a  sensitivity doesn’t strike us through visually harmonious forms or through 
a call to desire and frustrated love, but rather through a mediation built on the 
vulnerable dimensions of corporeality, namely through the reality of being 
a  body and having a  body: the reality of vulnerability due to corporeal 
materiality.
2. Getting out of conformity
The Squatting Aphrodite not only helps us to oppose an ordinary aesthetics to 
an idealizing one, but it also helps us exit aesthetic conformity, it helps us 
resist placing the value of the aesthetic experience in collective and pre-
established expectations. An attitude of conformity is the act of matching our 
behaviour to group norms, especially if we experience an object inside the 
walls of a museum and a gallery and we perceive it through the lenses of the 
institution. Certainly, expectations and psychological circumstances change if 
we are in the street or in a  theatre, but there is no evidence that this is true 
also for empirical conditions: it is with the same body and with the same eyes 
that we watch a show and that we observe passers-by in the street. In a theatre, 
our perceptual modality does not vary, it is only our attitude that changes. 
Conversely, one could contemplate a  passing street as if one were in the 
theatre, thus dissociating the subjective experience from its usual physical 
context. Georges Perec’s Tentative d’épuisement d’un lieu parisien (Perec, 1974) 
is a literary example of this second attitude.
Now, that the artworld1 gives legitimacy to the work does not imply – and it 
would even be a contradiction – that it generates the qualities that this same 
world recognizes as artistic. Conformity only recognizes art through its 
institutional codification and not through the process undergone by the artist. 
It sees art only once the latter has died, mummified in a  museum, the living 
process of its insurrection in the world lost forever. Aesthetic conformity 
forgets the process of poietics (poïétique), a practice of inspiration dear to Paul 
Valéry (Valéry, 1937, 1944); it also forgets René Passeron’s  concept 
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of  “instauration” (Passeron, 1989); it forgets the preliminary outlines, the 
sketches, the blockages, the failures, the experiments which are the very fabric 
of the “creative process”, dear to Marcel Duchamp and to the artistic lineage he 
inspired. 
And yet, as we have seen previously, the Squatting Aphrodite is placed in 
exactly the same room as the Venus de Milo, the material is the same, the 
forms represented are similar. Of course, we possess a  cultural heritage 
bound to our consciousness and knowledge. As spectators holding a  ticket, 
we enter the Louvre with certain expectations and experience. We already 
know the Venus de Milo, we have seen it represented, in photos, on posters 
and even sometimes on coffee cups. Her presence is expected and we will 
meet her as if she were a  celebrity. The Squatting Aphrodite, on the other 
hand, is a mutilated copy of a lost and more precious statue made of bronze. 
We do not know her, we did not expect to meet and face her, nor did we look 
for her. This is why the encounter we might have with the Squatting 
Aphrodite is similar to the encounter with what Duchamp names “the beauty 
of indifference” which he invokes for his ready-mades. The power of the 
ready-made is a sort of delayed sabotage: ready-mades are objects of neutral 
or contradictory beauty, which we don't really like, and they don't possess 
harmonious qualities. The beauty of indifference implies that we like them 
precisely because we look the other way. The Squatting Aphrodite, while 
being a  sculpture, embodies ordinary qualities; although installed in 
a  museum, it nevertheless strikes us with both indifference and 
attractiveness. 
The Squatting Aphrodite, with its mutilated form, is more easily recognizable 
as an aesthetic object by the gaze of a spectator who has become accustomed 
to modern and contemporary art. Her shape is trans-temporal. The political 
and aesthetic characteristics of the Squatting Aphrodite are more 
contemporary and turn away from classical categories. As a  mutilated 
sculpture, it could also be seen as purposely unfinished and, since it has 
realistic characteristics, it could be understood as a figure of the modern era. 
It thus contradicts the place that has been chosen for her in the Louvre, and 
in particular next to the Venus of Milo, which dominates the room. In this 
situation, the aesthetic conformity is undermined since the institutional 
context and the cultural history no longer play their role. 
Hence, if we take the problem not from the standpoint of what John Dewey 
called, not without irony, “the museum conception of art”, but rather from 
the standpoint of the artists, their experience, their grammar, or their life, 
we can see that the criterion of context changes, and becomes less decisive. 
It is possible to understand and shape the definition and the experience of 
art outside its conventional places (museums, theatres or galleries). This is 
what artists themselves have been demonstrating for more than half 
a century. The physical places and institutions that publicize themselves as 
representatives of the art world can no longer, according to this new 
perspective, act with creative power, but must be satisfied with symbolic 
power. 
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The ordinary, with its erotic and sensitive impact, is not transmitted through the 
symbolism of ideas. During the neo-avant-garde, artists set themselves up against 
the limits imposed by the traditional artistic contexts. The aesthetics of the 
ordinary, the art of the banal became exemplary in the 20th century. It suffices to 
think of Daniel Buren’s  unofficial urban poster campaigns, Allan 
Kaprow’s  happenings, the Situationist Internationale’s  urban rambles, Joseph 
Beuys’ actions, Anna Halprin’s  life-like-dances, Fluxus’ ironic gestures, Trisha 
Brown, or the Judson Dance Theatre’s  choreographies to realize the fecundity 
of  this approach and its importance with regard to critical theory. By placing 
themselves in an urban space or within nature, these practices, while being 
recognized as artistic, sought to extract themselves from the “genetic” influence 
of  the institutional artistic context, as well as from the capitalist and neo-liberal 
influence that animates it.
Through the strength of its form, and through its practical posture, the Squatting 
Aphrodite instructs us on the vulnerable strength of ordinary life. She shows that 
living is a form of response to life’s injunctions (washing, eating, sleeping, finding 
shelter), that life is a  kind of domestication of feelings and emotions, and that 
experience is never immediate but always interspersed with layers of meaning. The 
life we live requires us to perform obligations and leaves little time for relaxation 
and pleasure, especially for those people who are subalterns, poor and in distress. 
The Squatting Aphrodite shows that living is a holistic and intertwined experience, 
in which ordinary gestures related to bodily needs are directly connected to 
an emotional dimension: washing one’s body is also a moment of the exchange of 
love. The Squatting Aphrodite embodies, in my opinion, the condition of living, 
which Hannah Arendt (1958) named “the human condition”. This condition is to be 
sought in “plurality”, i.e., in the fact that we are born in a  relation of care and 
dependence. 
From the standpoint of Arendt’s notion of plurality, if the Venus de Milo is isolated, 
a  unique, one of a  kind figure, on the other hand, the Squatting Aphrodite, in 
contrast, is ‘double’: she is not alone, she is with her son. Plurality as part of the 
human condition opens to the dimension of politics, as Arendt shows. Each of the 
activities categorized under the concepts of “labour”, “work” and “action” are 
caught in a  web of interdependent relationships. Acting in isolation is 
a contradiction in terms. The idea of vita activa as Arendt proposes it in The Human 
Condition, shows that biological life and political action are connected and that 
philosophy needs to grasp the inner relation between natality and history. Of 
course, in Arendt this is more a  political than an aesthetic problem. Arendt 
underlies the features proper to the subject who acts under the often merciless light 
of public life. In parallel to Arendt’s  political insight, we can see how, within the 
realm of aesthetics, once conformity no longer plays a role, aesthetic experience is 
emancipated from the art world and its institutional contexts. A  work of art is 
capable of striking us so deeply that it shows us our own intimacy and the plurality 
of our shared emotional condition, to the point that it sets in motion the very 
foundations of identity. On this basis, we can see that any situation whatsoever 
becomes active and vital in so far as a relationship is engaged within it: this incites 
us to define the situation through plurality, vulnerability and inclusiveness.
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3. Ordinary sensibility and everyday aesthetics
We have seen previously that the Squatting Aphrodite helps us to look at the 
ordinary instead of the ideal (through the distinction with the Venus de Milo) 
and it helps us also to escape the context of the museum through the link with 
the plural condition of humanity. In this third section, I will show how it serves 
us in understanding the difference between ordinary sensibility and everyday 
aesthetics. What is ordinary sensibility and why is it not the same as everyday 
aesthetics? 
Let us simply recall that sensibility is not an equivalent of aesthetics. Even 
though aesthetics concerns the domain of the sensible, as the Greek term 
aisthesis indicates, the history of aesthetics and its link with culture has taken 
the idea of aesthetics out of the body and its organic senses in order to 
intellectualize aesthetics and to produce a  particular kind of consciousness. 
This philosophical turn, accomplished in an exemplary manner within the 
German tradition from Baumgarten to Hegel and beyond, is of crucial 
importance. It is in this way that aesthetics has become independent and 
separated from the philosophy of knowledge. The problem is that this 
transformation occurred at the expense of relegating the body, and especially 
the deeply animal somatic characteristics of human experience, to a  lower 
level, excluding them from the realm of aesthetics, as happens for instance in 
the Hegelian system of the fine arts, which dismisses the role of the senses of 
smell and touch  in aesthetics.
In contrast, everydayness and ordinary aesthetics opens the path seeking to 
recover the sensible even from the standpoint of its sensibility, which can be 
defined simply as a return to the senses and to things that can be sensed. From 
a very basic point of view, it can be related to sense data without being reduced 
to it. Sense data is a  popular concept employed in the early 20th century by 
philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, C. D. Broad, H. H. Price, A.J. Ayer, and 
G.E. Moore. The important point for me here is that sense data are supposedly 
properties that are known directly to us via perception. In other words, sensible 
properties are derived from an unanalyzed experience. These data are thus 
distinct from the ‘real’ objects in the world outside the mind, about whose 
existence and properties, in contrast, we can often be mistaken. This is the 
main reason why sense data theories were criticized by philosophers such as 
J.L. Austin, and Wilfrid Sellars, mainly because sense data appears 
as something that is simply given (Sellars most notably formulated his famous 
“Myth of the Given” argument). 
This is not the place to go into details about the complicated debate 
concerning sense data in contemporary philosophy. Rather, I  would like to 
invoke the importance of the senses over intellectual understanding in order to 
grasp the specificity of ordinary aesthetic experience. The non-reflexive 
experience afforded by ordinary life does not possess the structure of logical 
judgment, nor does it provide clear knowledge, and yet it is quite evident to the 
senses. This evidence could be linked to a  type of intuition that does not 
require the operations of cognition; it is the realm of sensibilia. How can we 
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2 The French word Raisonnement is in the original version.
describe sensibilia?  Sensibilia can be understood in this context as sense data 
that give rise to an aesthetic experience without judgment or imagination. 
They are experienced with no distance and they build an aesthetics with no 
imagination. 
This is why, in order to maintain the ordinary aspect of aesthetic experience, 
it is important to remain on the bodily level of sense data without including 
imagination, which can lead us into rather misleading metaphysical grounds 
since it involves the intellect. Contrary to ordinary sensibilia, imaginary 
sense data are abstract stimuli as presented from the senses to 
consciousness because imagination includes inner subjective states of self-
awareness such as expressive emotion and self-reflection. This is why 
I prefer to think of sense data as separate from abstraction and related to the 
animal senses and the biological dimension. 
This aspect of our inquiry leads us to explore the role of animality in 
aesthetics, as Wittgenstein pointed out: there is something fundamentally 
uncertain in our supposed knowledge, an uncertainty reassured by mutual 
trust, which reveals the primitive form of our functioning. Wittgenstein, 
most commonly considered the father of the philosophy of language, never 
invoked abstraction in philosophy. On the contrary, especially in his latest 
philosophy we find a  form of logic that is primitive and unanalysed, as 
shown by § 475 of On Certainty: “I want to regard man here as an animal; as  
a  primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As  
a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means 
of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from 
some kind of ratiocination [Raisonnement]”2 (Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 38). 
Language is a veil draped over a feeling of shame coming from our animality. 
Wittgenstein encourages us to be uninhibited, to remain on “the rough 
ground” of the ordinary, to assume the mixture of impressions and 
expressions, to keep the indistinguishability between my gesture and that of 
others, to remain in the minimal primitivism of our ways of communicating, 
because, in some odd ways, shame could be useful to comprehension. This 
animal primitivism evoked by Wittgenstein could assist us in redrawing the 
sense of our gestures and our language. It could allow us to understand how 
animality plays an essential role in the expression of our forms of life, and 
how such expression builds continuity between nature and culture.
After having outlined the main features of sensibility and its difference from 
the aesthetic, I still need to explain what I mean by the ordinary and how it 
is not identical to the everyday. First of all, the ordinary possesses a form of 
neutrality, it has no special or distinctive features, it is somehow normal. 
The ordinary is ‘common’, and ‘average”’ and in contrast to the everyday the 
adjective ‘ordinary’ is often used in a  derogatory sense. “This restaurant is 
very ordinary” does not simply mean that it is normal or mainstream, but 
rather that it is mediocre. This is one of the main reasons why the semantics 
of the ‘ordinary’ is resistant if not oppositional with regard to the realm of 
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traditional aesthetics. The everyday can still contain something special and 
remarkable, but the ordinary is intrinsically common, both banal and 
shared. 
The everyday does possess its own aesthetic tradition that I can quickly recall 
here, particularly in the French tradition. Maurice Blanchot (1962)  L’Homme de 
la rue was directly inspired by Henri Lefebvre (1961) - and particularly by the 
second volume of the Critique de la mise en scène quotidienne, called Fondements 
d'une sociologie de la quotidienneté. Other authors have also worked on this 
everyday: Michel de Certeau (1980) was interested in the social procedures of 
consumption and production; Georges Perec (1974) discovered 
an  inexhaustible source for literary innovating in the observation of the 
everyday. More recently, two works have admirably summarized previous 
results and opened them up to new avenues of research, whether in literature 
(Sheringham, 2006) or in philosophy (Bégout, 2005). 
One could add to this scholarly research, a  whole series of scientific books, 
artists’ monographs, exhibition catalogues, writings in criticism and art history 
on this theme of the everyday. Among this vast panorama, we can quote the 
very well-known works of Yuriko Saito (2007; 2017) who carried aesthetic 
investigation to the margins of ethical and ecological concerns by focusing on 
the qualities of our common existence as the dirty, the neglected and the 
organized. She developed a  very subtle critique of ‘neutrality’ by opening the 
debate to the Japanese aesthetics. A  similar concern is also present in the 
research of Thomas Leddy (2012) who investigates the connection with the 
aesthetic categories of the natural environment and the sublime. Arnold 
Berleant (2010) also raises questions of a  political nature and anchors all 
human activity in aesthetic experience. The interest of this vast research 
enterprise lies in the fact that the idea of the everyday helps to craft 
a  dimension of aesthetic values that serves as a  counterpoint to the classical 
idea of beauty and aesthetic judgement as ‘pure’ intellectual operations. The 
everyday refuses the posture of the Hegelian “belle âme” or the Kantian 
disinterest in order to situate the aesthetic experience in a ‘raw’ context. From 
the point of view of the everyday day, aesthetics is already covered with 
meanings, signifiers, cultural habits and affects; aesthetics is never pure.
Nevertheless, a  crucial difference between the ordinary and the everyday, is 
that the idea of the ordinary seems to be much less flexible. Indeed one can 
indicate a very organized formal modality in the ordinary, a way of proceeding 
that is less personal or less free than that animating daily life and experience. 
Etymology lends support to this aspect of the ordinary: ordinarius means 
‘judge’ in Latin, someone who is discerning and applies order. More generally, 
in the semantic range of the ordinary, if one moves away from the subjective 
realm, one also moves away from the world of the intimate and of ritualization. 
The ordinary thus loses the religious residue that the everyday, on the contrary, 
maintains. 
Thus, the concept of the ordinary has also arisen through a  kind of 
democratization if not even a profanation of the everyday, as we can see in the 
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work of one of its greatest defenders, the American philosopher Stanley Cavell 
(1988). In the wake of Wittgenstein, Cavell was able to turn the ordinary into 
a real philosophical object. Cavell discovers, or better ‘recovers’ in the ordinary 
an unusual, even disturbing dimension, aptly summarized by the  Freudian 
expression of “the uncanniness of the ordinary”. Cavell's approach is meant to 
show the ordinary through a ‘sceptical’ conversion of the gaze, in which doubt 
plays the same role as philosophical astonishment. This conversion is fecund 
because it takes the ordinary to be a non-obvious dimension. It contradicts any 
presupposition that the ordinary is inferior.
Yet, there are two main reasons that I prefer the ordinary to the everyday: its 
form of temporality and its inter-subjectivity. The first reason lies in the fact 
that the ordinary remains fundamentally indeterminate with regard to the 
temporality according to which activities take place. If the everyday is repeated 
automatically (every day), the ordinary is more a  matter of the simple 
possibility of repetition (one could do  it each day). Sweeping the floor is an 
ordinary activity, although it is not necessarily a daily one. The daily belongs to 
the present, the ordinary is projected onto the conditional. The second reason 
(inter-subjectivity), lies in the fact that the everyday is subjective and 
individual whereas the ordinary is inter-subjective and plural; the everyday of 
an acrobat or an airplane pilot cannot be called ‘ordinary’. If the everyday is ad 
personam, the ordinary is impersonal. As I  have shown elsewhere (Formis, 
2010), the ordinary encompasses several ‘everydays’: it is a modality of living, 
whereas the everyday brings together the multiple singular applications of this 
general modality. 
If the everyday is private and intimate, the ordinary is collective and social. If 
the everyday is what everyone does, the ordinary is what could be done by 
anyone. The everyday is in the actual, the ordinary in the potential. We can say 
that the everyday calls upon a very precise individuality and temporality (what 
I  do  every day), whereas the ordinary is less determined: it evokes a  larger 
community and potential capacities (what I/we could do  at any moment). 
While the everyday consists of a  series of daily personal activities and thus 
remains of the order of the real, the ordinary is not always an execution, but 
very often a potentiality of execution. The ordinary thus adds a dimension of 
possibility to the real. 
Thus, unlike the everyday, the ordinary firmly opposes a  resistance to the 
extra-ordinary – and this point is crucial since it testifies to its anti-
metaphysical tendency. My everyday life can become extraordinary once 
I  extract (extra) a  certain number of qualities (ritual, intimate, poetic, 
imaginary, etc.) from it. The ordinary, on the other hand – as long as it is 
intrinsically common and collective – retains only the minimal qualities of 
experience: it does not ‘colour’ itself with a  whole series of personal and 
singular nuances, and if it does, it is as an attitude or a way of doing things and 
can never be universalized. It is because the ordinary remains more neutral 
than the everyday that it poses a  real challenge to our idea of art and 
aesthetics, the latter being understood as the privileged places of pleasure and 
beauty. From my perspective, the ordinary is similar to what Pierre Bourdieu 
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3 Bourdieu defines the habitus, as the “capacity to produce classifiable practices and works, and 
the capacity to differentiate and appreciate these practices and products (taste), that the 
represented social world, i.e., the space of life-styles, is constituted” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 94). 
Similar to habitus, ordinariness allows us to understand the modus operandi of an individual 
and a social class in relation to the cultural context. Moreover, because it makes habitus 
a principle of “distinction”, Bourdieu's approach would also evoke the primary function of the 
ordinary as judge, namely discernment.
4 Although he sometimes uses the term every-day, Dewey follows the English usage and often 
prefers ordinary and compares ‘ordinary’ experience to ‘aesthetic’ experience (Dewey, 1934, 
see especially p. 12 and p. 6).
calls the habitus3, namely the generating principle of our life modalities, and 
also to what John Dewey names ordinary, a  dimension potentially collective 
and thus differentiated from the every-day4. The indeterminacy of the ordinary 
is thus more fundamental than that of the everyday. Its difference with the 
everyday is thus useful insofar as it confers a collective and multiple character 
upon life.
4. Conclusion. Political Implications of Ordinary Art
Let’s  now go back, one last time, to our visit at the Louvre. The Squatting 
Aphrodite is thus profoundly ordinary, with also the derogatory implications 
that this adjective embodies. That's why she embodies ordinary sensibilia more 
than the everyday aesthetics and seems to be particularly rich in philosophical 
and aesthetic qualities: she approaches what Wittgenstein calls “forms of 
life” (Lebensform). Moreover this powerful concept has been massively 
imported into the field of the art by artists themselves or by theorists, such as 
Nicolas Bourriaud (2009) who made it into the foundation for his theory of 
relational aesthetics (Bourriaud, 2003). There is something extremely banal in 
the very fact of living in a human body, but this banality is in reality highly rich 
in meaning, because it is precisely in the multiplicity of the micro-events that 
are common to all of us that one of the most philosophical and truthful 
meanings of existence is hidden: the irreducibly shared and indiscriminate 
plurality of living beings. It is through gestures that we inhabit the world, that 
we shape it in our own way, it is through gestures that the world gives itself to 
us, in all its texture, its form of appearance and in its vitality. 
My hypothesis is that it is not really when experience rises above the 
mediocrity of everyday life that it becomes aesthetic, but rather it does so by 
recourse to an inverse process. It is when experience infiltrates and ‘dives’ 
completely into the murky waters of reality, with all that it may have in 
common with repetition and indifference, that it shows potentially aesthetic 
qualities. This contrasts obviously with classical aesthetics in the sense that art 
does not try to improve life, but takes it with its own qualities, without any 
attempt at transformation. Thus, for example, repetition allows one to relive 
and show an experience without transfiguring it, contra Arthur 
Danto’s  conception (Danto, 1981). Consciousness within such repetitions 
remains distracted as in the ordinary accomplishment of our activities, if not 
even more so. 
This kind of ordinary aesthetic experience is impersonal and collectively 
shared and thus avoids the risk of subjectivity via a fundamental critique of the 
exceptional and the singular. With respect to this line of thinking, the Squatting 
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Aphrodite is very instructive. Ordinary art, especially in its gestural or 
performative form, opens up another kind of experience, it reveals a corporeal 
experience in which the subject is collective and dispersed, and which does not 
lend itself to the classic criteria of judgment, nor to the distance of 
contemplation. Of course, one could object that this will lead to the dissolution 
of art in the troubled waters of life. Perhaps this is the case, but it is probably 
the only way to aesthetically frame a  properly performative experience of 
ordinary life. Ordinary sensibilia instruct us in the aesthetic character of human 
experience. They show how human experience is anchored in a  cultural and 
collective context. They reveal the vulnerability of human beings, the 
possibility of making mistakes, appearing weak, and feeling emotions that are 
difficult to control. 
Vulnerability is what leads to sociability, dialogue and the emergence of 
communities around work. When vulnerability is evoked by ordinary sensibilia, 
recipients take on an active position of witness and go beyond the comfortable 
position of a passive, uninvolved audience. Such human characteristics are not 
to be considered as defects to be corrected, according to an idealistic vision of 
the human being, but on the contrary as powers and forces for action. This is 
one of the major challenges posed by contemporary art, especially in its 
relationship to political space and social practices. It is a  challenge worth 
undertaking, though, one that should also be taken up from the standpoint of 
art’s philosophical anchoring and its capacity to create conceptual operations. 
Ordinary art could thus act as a  philosophical and social laboratory in which 
concepts and relationships may be forged in an exploratory and experimental 
way.
Ordinary aesthetics, or the aesthetics of the ordinary teaches us that the 
incompleteness of figures and the display of mutilation become forms of 
resistance. Plurality per se is a  challenge to individualization. The Squatting 
Aphrodite can thus be assumed as a model, an exemplar. It presents a broken 
but resistant subject who does not function like the Kantian subject of 
a  transcendental order, which is capable of accompanying all our 
representations. Rather, the type of subject emerging from this work’s gestural 
indiscernibility arises from an animal organism, from a body that is capable of 
emotions, of sensitive impressions, of desires and fear. This subjective form is 
fundamentally impersonal and plural, breaking from the idea of individual 
subject and embracing the realm of practice: it moves amongst things, reacts 
and interacts with the forces and tensions that surround it as well as those that 
inhabit it. 
This kind of subjective form is highly political because individualization forges 
a  single form by considering all the objects, machines, and instruments that 
the body uses as subordinate to it, as in a hierarchy. This is Simondon’s great 
lesson in Du monde d’existence des objets techniques (1958) et L’individuation 
à  la  lumière de notion de forme et d’information (2005). The collective force of 
the gestures is thus employed to reorganize culture through shaping nature, 
nature itself being understood as a  formless matrix. This quite patriarchal 
vision sees in the forms of action a  way of identifying forces and tensions 
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which can unify and avoid alienation only if subordination is set up. The 
machine and the tool must be governed by our hands. This alienation is 
connected, as Marx had already indicated, to a capitalist vision of society, since 
it is based on the division between mental and manual, between the 
contemplative and the practical, between knowledge and labor. It is 
an alienation that is not simply economic and political, it is not limited to the 
possession of the means of production (in Marx’s  terms), but it also touches 
more widely the psychological and anthropological dimensions that account 
for what we call an ‘activity’. 
The specter of alienation can also cover ordinary experiences, because the 
latter is produced by multiple forms of interactions and reactions. It is 
essential to integrate this fear of alienation rather than attempting to avoid or 
banish it, because otherwise it risks creating other alienations and other 
dominations, as it systematically does. These forms of alienation are more 
insidious and dangerous precisely because they have been rendered invisible: 
the fear of feeling alienated, of losing one’s  means of production and 
reflection, makes the human subject (often masculine, or at least masculinized) 
lose his equilibrium, which will, in turn, start alienating natural energies and 
ecological resources, just like a  whole series of other human subjects who 
belong to other social classes, races and genders. These subjects and these 
energies are thus in their turn instrumentalized and subordinated.
Through this speculative analysis of the impression, the impact, and effect of 
the ordinary in its gestural form within a  single statue, we have seen that 
forces and tensions emerge between means and ends, domination and 
subordination, power and alienation, violence and freedom. It is quite 
remarkable that a  simple gesture and a  banal posture can reveal a  whole 
panoply of attitudes and postures caught up in a  multitude of intertwined 
relations.  This multitude of relations shows that the subject of a  supposed 
‘gesture’ can only forge herself as an individual subject at the price of a certain 
violence that impacts something or someone else: an object, an instrument, 
a machine, or another living being (human or non-human). The human subject 
completes her process of individualization once she has overcome a resistance 
and has been made able to forge a  form where the forces are minor, or 
minorized. Hence, although non-completion and mutilation may be perceived 
as dangers, they nevertheless remain a stage to be included in the very process 
of giving rise to subjectivity worthy of this name; that is to say, a subjectivity 
that is neither individual nor violent, but collective and peaceful.
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